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Public policies, productivity and economic growth in OECD countries  
  
 
Abstract 
Since mid-1990s social sciences have re-started to give attention to the role played by the 
state in promoting economic growth, with important contributions from economists, 
sociologists and political scientists. This attention further increased after the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/08, with a rising strand of research that is focusing on the institutional 
foundations of different growth models in advanced economies. This paper is related to this 
wide strand of research and analyzes how industrial policies can favor the emerging of 
institutional conditions that are conducive to economic growth. In particular, the paper 
analyzes the neglected relationship between public policies and labor productivity in OECD 
countries. The focus is on four policy arenas that have a direct impact on labor productivity: 
labor market, human capital, innovation and on the efficiency of public administration. The 
analysis underlines a strong association between labour productivity and public policies 
addressed to promote training and activation, the quality of educational institutions and inter-
institutional networks in innovation. Other kind of policies, such as those addressed to 
flexibilise the labour market or to reduce labour costs or to increase the average number of 
years of schooling seem to play a minor role. 
 
 
Keywords: Industrial Policies; Labour Market Regulation; Education; Labour Productivity; 
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2 
Introduction1 
Since mid-1990s social sciences have re-started to give attention to the role played by the state 
in promoting economic growth, with important contributions from economists (Acemoglou 
and Robinson 2013, Gordon 2016; Rodrik 2004), sociologists and political scientists 
(Liebfried et al. 2015; King and Le Galès 2017), comparative political economy scholars (Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Crouch 2015; Amable 2003; Hanckè et al 2007), etc. This attention further 
increased after the economic and financial crisis of 2007/08, influenced by the growing role 
played by the state in sustaining and defending national economies, with a series of policy 
interventions that can be defined as ‘economic patriotism’ (Clift and Woll, 2013). At the same 
time, a lot of attention has been dedicated to the main features and the institutional foundations 
of different growth models in advanced economies (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Hassel and 
Palier 2018). 
This paper is related to this wide strand of research and analyzes how industrial and 
development policies can favor the emerging of institutional conditions that are conducive to 
economic growth. In particular, I would like to underline some aspects that have been 
neglected by the literature of comparative political economy (CPE)2, namely the relationship 
between public policies and labor productivity: many comparative analysis have underlined 
the link between productivity and the forms of work organisation or the level of investment 
made by firms in technological innovation but the role played by public policies in sustaining 
labour productivity has been often overlooked.  
In order to better understand the relationship between public policies and productivity, I will 
cluster OECD countries in three groups: high productivity growth, low productivity growth 
and catching up countries. Then, I will focus on three policy arenas that have a direct impact 
on labor productivity: labor market, human capital, innovation. At the same time, I will focus 
on a ‘mainstream’ variable, the efficiency of public administration that has a direct impact on 
the functioning of public policies in the three above-mentioned arena. The analysis of the role 
of the state in the different clusters at mid 90s’ will underline the importance of public policies 
addressed to sustain training and activation, the quality of educational institutions and 
different types of investments in innovation. Other kind of policies, such as those addressed 
to flexibilise the labour market, to reduce labour costs, or to increase the average number of 
years of schooling seem to play a minor role. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second paragraph analyses growth path among OECD 
countries in two periods, 1995-2017 and 2008-2017. The third section briefly deals with some 
theoretical and empirical contributions that emphasize the importance of labour regulation, 
human capital and innovation in explaining economic and productivity growth. The fourth  
                                                 
1 This work benefited from a period of visiting at the LIEPP and at the CEE of Sciences Po, in the spring/autumn 2018. I am 
extremely grateful to Bruno Palier, Patrick Le Galès and Tommaso Vitale for these invitations. During this period, I had the 
opportunity to discuss issues related to this paper with so many colleagues that it would be impossible to thank all of them 
singularly. I am also extremely grateful to an anonymous referee for his/her very useful comments and suggestions. 
2 With some relevant exception, see for example Amable 2016. 
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paragraph analyzes the relationship between a series of public policies in the three above-
mentioned fields and labour productivity. The fifth part sets out the conclusions. 
I. Economic growth and productivity in OECD countries 
In order to identify which countries have grown more rapidly over the last three decades, we 
first need to define how to measure our "dependent variable", namely economic growth. As it 
is well known, this is a concept that can be defined in many different ways. I have chosen to 
consider one of the simplest definition that takes into account the dynamic of GDP per capita, 
an indicator that shows the capacity of a country to create economic prosperity. Obviously, 
the adoption of this indicator has a set of very well-known limitations. First, the level of GDP 
per capita tells us nothing about how this GDP is distributed and on income inequality, but 
only gives us information about a country's capability to produce economic wealth. Second, 
per capita GDP does not cover the contribution of those services and activities that are not 
exchanged for money, and the size of these activities varies greatly from country to country. 
Third, this is a measure that refers only to the production of economic prosperity and not of 
well-being as a whole, that is an extremely complex dimension strongly related to non-
economic aspect. However, despite these limitations, there is no doubt that per capita GDP 
continues to be a simple but effective indicator to assess a country's economic growth. 
A second important step is related to the explanation of why I decided to measure growth from 
the mid-1990s to the present. The main reason is that looking at a time frame of about a quarter 
of century allows us to adopt a non-conjunctural approach and helps to better evaluate changes 
in various growth models. At the same time, at mid-1990s a series of transformations emerged, 
ranging from the intensification of economic globalization, to the increase in international 
competition, to the rise of new global players such as China and India; in other words, the 
mid-1990s were an important critical juncture that had a relevant impact on competitive 
strategies and growth models of OECD countries.  
Third, it is important to note that at the beginning of this period, OECD countries did not start 
from the same 'starting blocks': the level of GDP per capita was very different from country 
to country. This emerges clearly if we use a convergence plot, that shows for each country the 
trend of GDP per capita and its level in the mid-1990s (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. GDP per capita level and growth 1995-2017* 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
* GDP is measured with US dollars at purchasing power parity calculated for 2011 
 
The analysis of levels and growth rates of per capita income shows some interesting trends 
(fig. 1). First of all, some countries started from a very low level of GDP per capita but 
progressively grown at a high rate over the entire period here analyzed. These countries are 
characterized by a growth path that can be defined as catching-up, a process that reduced the 
distances between the countries with high and low per capita GDP. In particular, high growth 
rates characterized the Baltic countries (Lithuania and Estonia) and the Visegrad group 
(Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary). Ireland joined this group despite having 
a higher level of income per capita already at mid-1990s. This process of reduction of 
differences was particularly intense but not sufficient to eliminate inequalities in terms of per 
capita income between developing and advances economies. 
Among advanced economies, differences in terms of growth appear less pronounced, but this 
does not mean that they are irrelevant (fig. 1). Sweden, for example, increased the per capita 
GDP from $ 31,000 in 1995 to 47,000 in 2017, while in the same period Italy increased the 
GDP per capita from $ 33,100 to 35,200: at this rate, Sweden takes 43 years to double its per 
capita income while Italy takes 352 years. Among advanced economies, those that 
experienced a higher growth rate were Sweden, Finland, Australia, New Zealand. On the 
contrary, Greece and Italy are the two countries with the lowest growth. If we reduce the time 
span of the analysis to the post 2007 crisis, we note that the process of catching-up continues 
with the notable growth of Turkey, Poland, Korea, while the advanced economies with the 
highest growth rate are Ireland, Germany, Sweden, the United States and Australia. Greece 
and Italy are, with Finland and Spain, at the bottom of this ranking (Fig. 2). 
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Figure 2. GDP per capita level and growth 2008-2017 
 
 
Source: Processed data from Stat-OECD 
 
This different rate of increase in GDP is the result of the combination of two process of 
change: on the one hand, the change in labour productivity, here defined as the ratio between 
the GDP produced and the number of hours worked in a country, on the other the change in 
labor utilization, the total amount of hours worked in a country. Thus, GDP growth can be the 
result of an increase in the number of hours worked or the result of an increase in labour 
productivity: if productivity doubles, even with the same number of hours worked, GDP will 
also double. Figure 3 and 4 show that during the period 1995-2017 the growth of per capita 
income in OECD countries has been more related to the effect of the increase in productivity 
rather than of an increase in the labour utilization: there is a positive association between labor 
productivity and GDP growth per capita, while there is no direct association between growth 
in labor utilization and per capita income growth. 
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Figure 3.   GDP per capita growth and labour utilisation (1995-2017) 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
 
Figure 4.   GDP per capita growth and labour productivity growth (1995-2017) 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
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This brief analysis underlines five important issues. First, among advanced economies that 
experienced higher growth rates there are countries with different traditions of political 
economy, such as the coordinated capitalism of Sweden and Germany and the liberal 
capitalism of the United States and Australia. At the same time, there are countries of these 
two models that do not have a good performance, such as Japan among the coordinated market 
economies and the United Kingdom for the Anglo-Saxon countries. The second important 
aspect is that some countries are permanently in the group with greatest difficulty, such as 
Italy and Greece. Third, the growth rate is not constant for each country, there are countries 
that grow more in some phases and not in others: this is the case of Spain, that experienced a 
notable growth until the 2007 crisis when a long period of serious difficulty started; as it is 
well-known, this is also the case of Germany, that at the beginning of 2000s was defined ‘the 
sick man of Europe’ and in the following 15 years has been characterised by a very robust 
growth. This is why it is very important to look at countries that change trajectories and at 
their critical junctures. Fourth, as shown by a solid tradition of studies, in the last thirty years 
there has been an advantage for those countries which started from a situation of greater 
backwardness, which often grow at higher rates than advanced economies; however, the 
institutional architecture that supported growth processes in these countries is very much 
different from the one that supported growth in advanced economies. Fifth, in order to 
understand growth, it is particularly important to focus on the trend of labor productivity: for 
this reason, it is important to study the kind of institutional context that favors the increase of 
productivity. 
II. Public policies and the three pillars of growth  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, advanced capitalisms have been facing new challenges such 
as the rise of international competition, the liberalisation of products and financial markets, 
the increasing scope for international trade and the rise of competition over low labour costs 
from countries such as China or India. Given these global changes, which have reduced the 
possibility of advanced economies to compete on the cost of products and services, it became 
a necessity for many countries to restructure their competitive strategies. The so-called ‘low 
road of development’, based on low-quality products and low labour costs came to an end for 
advanced economies, while the ‘high road’, based on innovation, productivity and 
diversification became the viable competitive strategy for Western economies (Hall & Soskice 
2001). 
The theoretical and empirical contributions on this shift towards the ‘high road’ have 
highlighted the importance of three pillars, namely labour market regulation, investment in 
human capital and investment in innovation, and have underlined the importance of 
institutional complementarity – the effects of mutual reinforcement – between them. The 
action of the state has a notable influence on these pillars and they have a direct impact on 
labour productivity. For this reason, the analysis of the action of the state in these three fields 
can help us to understand how public policies contribute to the making of an institutional 
environment favourable to the rise productivity and more in general to economic growth. 
To take the first pillar; at the beginning of the 1990s the low level of labour market flexibility 
– measured by the percentage of temporary employment or fixed-term contracts and by the 
2020/01 
 
 
8 
strictness of hiring and firing regulations for standard and non-standard employment - was 
identified as one of the main weaknesses of European capitalisms. The massive debate on the 
so-called Eurosclerosis, the economic stagnation which has characterised Europe in the 1970s 
and 1980s, emphasised that the high level of unemployment in European countries was 
directly created by the rigidity of the labour market (Esping-Andersen & Regini 2000; Korpi 
1996). In particular, many scholars explained that labour flexibility helps to deal with a 
volatile demand for products (Esping-Andersen & Regini 2000; Streeck 2009). Since then, 
the main trends in labour market regulation have been the adjustment of the labour supply to 
the requirements of the market, deregulation and rising labour market flexibility. At the same 
time, many studies underlined that in order to promote a shift towards the high road model, 
investments in labour quality, skills and productivity were necessary. However, in many 
countries the process of labour market adjustment was characterised by a selective flexibility, 
mainly addressed towards specific groups of workers through atypical contracts, but without 
any attempt to promote employment quality, and as a result, a strong dual labour market 
emerged (Palier 2010; Esping-Andersen & Regini 2000). However, the link between the 
increase in labour flexibility and the increase in labour productivity or economic growth is not 
clear; as we will see, there are countries that promoted a notable process of flexibilization 
without having a notable economic growth. On the contrary, we will see that there is a more 
direct association between investment in active labour market policies and training and the 
rise of per capita income. 
Another important strand of literature has underlined that competitiveness and productivity 
are related to a large extent to the availability of human capital, the second pillar described 
herein. At the beginning of the 1990s, Paul Romer and Robert Lucas studied economic growth 
and showed that productivity is linked to endogenous variables such as the skill levels of the 
workforce. Later, Robert Barro highlighted a clear relationship between the level of school 
attainment with economic performance, especially in the field of innovation (Barro 2001, 
Lucas 2015). More recent literature has explained differentials in the long-term economic 
fortunes of a nation with so-called knowledge capital, measured through the assessment of 
scientific skills (Hanushek and Woessmann 2015; Savvides and Stengos 2009). Over recent 
years, comparative research on European countries has shown the importance of education 
and training in the configuration of contemporary capitalism. Thelen (2014), for example, 
focused on vocational education and training in order to understand its impact on labour 
market outcomes; Busemeyer and Trampusch (2011) analysed professional training, 
identifying different mechanisms for the creation of skills, either based on the role of the state, 
such as in the French case, or, on the role of firms and social partners, such as in Germany, 
where specific institutions like the Fachhochschulen3 offer high levels of skills and 
specialisation that have been crucial in the rise in productivity of German firms. Overall, these 
scholars have shown that investment in education, training and skills have become a 
productive factor that enhances the economic competitiveness of advanced capitalism.  
                                                 
3 Tertiary education institutions specialised in applied sciences, primarily designed with a focus on technical and professional 
skills. 
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Third, there is a significant amount of literature on the importance of innovation policies4 for 
the competitiveness of high-tech sectors, as well as for the introduction of new technologies 
in medium- and low-tech sectors. Comparative political economy has emphasised that 
continental Europe and countries such as Germany have institutional contexts that are more 
favourable to incremental innovation, while Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the United states 
or the United Kingdom, are more prone to radical innovation. In both cases, the role of state 
policies is crucial in sustaining private innovation through direct policies or via indirect 
instruments such as public procurement (Mazzucato 2013; Block 2008). The role of the state 
also emerges as crucial in the literature on National Innovation Systems, which clarifies how 
different institutions contribute to the development and diffusion of technologies and 
innovation, influencing economic growth. Finally, analysis on the changing role of the state 
confirms that despite the reduced regulatory power in the economic sphere, national 
governments are particularly active in innovation policies, a domain where they maintain 
strong control (King & Le Galès 2017; Leibfried et al. 2015).  
These three pillars are heavily dependent on national policies and this is one of the most 
important reasons why the path towards the ‘high road’ has been followed at different speeds 
in different advanced economies characterised by different models of political economy. At 
the same time, these policy fields have many possible interdependencies: all of them produce 
effects that can promote some sort of complementarity and a mutual reinforcement (Aoki 
2001). Finally, their impact is strongly influenced not only by the quantity of funds dedicated 
to each area but also by the quality of their implementation and by the institutional capability 
of public administration; for this reason, it is particularly important to take into account the 
efficiency of public administration and its mainstream influence on the three pillars above 
mentioned. 
III. Labour productivity and the role of public policies Conclusion 
How to proceed to deepen the relationship between on the one hand the role of the state in 
these arenas and on the other productivity and economic growth? In order to study the impact 
of the action of the state on the three above-mentioned pillars I clustered OECD countries in  
three main groups: those with high productivity growth, those with low productivity growth 
and the catching-up countries. For each of this group, I analysed a series of different public 
policies that have had a direct impact on the regulation of the labour market, human capital 
and innovation at the beginning of the period of observation (mid-90s). In this way it is 
possible to identify the kind of public policies that characterized the three group of countries 
during mid-90s’. 
As for the three groups of countries, those that started from a very low level of GDP per capita 
and productivity grew at a much higher rate than the others for the so-called ‘advantage of 
backwardeness’: they can easily adopt technologies developed elsewhere and apply them to 
                                                 
4 Policies for innovation represent a broad family of policies addressed towards promoting innovation in the economic system, 
through support to research and development activities, regional innovation clusters, collaboration between public organiza-
tions and businesses on research and development programmes, incentives and loans to single firms to introduce technolog-
ical innovation, etc. 
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their productive cycle, or they can start cooperating with advanced economies - such as 
Hungary with Germany – strongly benefiting of this cooperation. For this reason, it is 
necessary to consider the countries that have undertaken catching-up processes as a group by 
themselves, where GDP grows as a result of a process of modernization of the economy that 
is very different from the dynamics of advanced economies. I define this group as catching-
up countries (CUCs) and it includes Chile, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, South 
Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey: the average per capita GDP of 
these countries in 1995 was just over $ 14,000, while in advanced economies it was more than 
double, about $ 32,000. 
Moreover, I clustered advanced economies in two groups, one that gathers countries with 
higher growth in labour productivity (High productivity growth countries– HPGs – Australia, 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, United Stated, Sweden and 
Switzerland) and the other that gathers advanced economies with lower level of productivity 
growth (Low productivity growth countries – LPGs - Belgium, Canada, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Greece, New Zealand, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom). These two groups 
can be easily compared because they had a similar starting level in terms of GDP per capita 
and in terms of productivity as well as in terms of technological innovation, business 
organizational models, competitive strategies, etc. 
As for the measure of productivity, I will refer to the ratio between GDP and hours worked. 
This is also called “apparent labour productivity”, an indicator that has some weaknesses: the 
term "apparent" is related to the fact that productivity depends on all the production factors – 
capital and labour - and on the way in which they are combined. Thus, growth in apparent 
labour productivity is not necessarily due to a higher efficiency of the labour but can also be 
related to higher growth in more capital-intensive sectors. For this reason, the sectorial 
specialization of a country influences the level of apparent labour productivity: a higher 
specialization in low added value and labour intensive activities such as construction or 
tourism will result in a lower level of productivity. For this reason, it is important to control 
what happens with the above-mentioned classification of countries when the analysis is 
carried out at the level of sector, where the relative intensity of use of the input factors (capital 
and labour) is similar. Figure 5 shows that the two group of countries are characterized by 
different degrees of productivity per sector: HPGs have higher levels of productivity 
independently by the kind of productive specialization that is taken into account. This means 
that even if the indicator of apparent labour productivity should be interpreted with care, the 
clusters of countries here analysed are consistent with an analysis of productivity at sectoral 
level. 
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Figure 5. Productivity per hour worked per sector in 2016 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
Then, I identified a series of indicators that covers public policies intervention in the three 
above mentioned arena plus some indicators on the efficiency of government. All these data 
refer to the mid-90s. In particular, as far as the labor market is concerned, I processed data 
measuring labor flexibility and labor market policies, taking into account the level of 
Employment Protection Legislation for standard employment, an indicator developed by the 
OECD which measures the rigidity/flexibility of the labor market, i.e. the procedures and costs 
that individual and collective dismissals entail; even if this indicator covers only one of the 
dimensions related to labor market flexibility, it is generally adopted as a proxy for external 
flexibility (a higher level of EPL results in a lower level of flexibility in the labor market). 
Second, I focus on the level of temporary employment; in this case it is important to consider 
that this is an indicator of the spread of forms of temporary work, but it does not automatically 
cover external flexibility: there are countries with a very high level of labour market flexibility 
and with a low level of regulation of standard employment where the use of forms of time-
determined employment is less developed, such as the UK or Denmark. I take also into 
account the average level of taxation on dependent work, as a measure of the burden of taxes 
on employment (data source OECD). Two other indexes come from the archive of the Global 
Competitive Index of the database of the World Economic Forum: the first is a synthetic index 
that considers a broad set of dimensions of flexibility (wages, hiring and firing, etc.), the 
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12 
with productivity and growth are those that have favored skills or those that have favored 
labor market flexibility. 
As regards human capital, I took into account the enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary 
education as well as indicators on the quality of the educational path, such as those which 
measure the quality of mathematical and scientific disciplines and of management disciplines, 
as well as those related to a more general evaluation of the quality of educational institutions. 
Finally, I analyzed the level of public spending per student in the tertiary cycle. With these 
data it is possible to better understand if growth is associated with policy strategy most focused 
on enlarging their stock of human capital increasing the average number of years of schooling, 
namely human capital broadening, or with policy strategy which improves the quality of 
schooling, namely human capital deepening (O’Brien and Williams, 2016). 
As regards investment in innovation, I focused on indicators of the OECD and World Bank 
database on investments in basic research as a percentage of GDP, on the overall expenditure 
in support of public research and development (public financed GERD), on expenditure on 
research and development made by private companies, on the level of public procurement in 
high technology activities, on the availability of venture capital, on the quality of scientific 
institutions and the degree of collaboration between university and business. 
Finally, data on the functioning of public administration: in this case, I analysed data from 
World Bank database that gathers indicators to assess the effectiveness of public 
administration, and in particular, a) data on the  Rule of law, or the perception and trust of 
stakeholders that actors follow the rules of society, and in particular to the quality of the 
protection of contracts, property rights, police and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence; b) data on Regulatory quality, or the perceptions of the government's ability to 
formulate and implement solid policies and regulations that allow and promote the 
development of the private sector and c) Government effectiveness, that is the perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of the formulation and implementation of policies and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to of these policies. 
For each of these indicators and for each country I considered the data at the initial period of 
observation (mid ‘90s) and considered the standardized value on the OECD average (OECD 
average =1,0) and then I identified the average value for each of the three groups (Fig. 6). 
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Figure 6. Public policies and the three pillars of growth in mid 90s’ (OECD aver-
age=1,000) 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
 
For each indicator, data refer to 1995. When this was not possible because data were not available, I took into account the first available 
years after 1995. 
Flexibility: synthetic index on flexibility CGI – World Economic Forum  
 Temporary employment: share of temporary employment on total employment - OECD 
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 Labour market policies- training: Public expenditure in active labour market policies as a percentage of GDP - OECD 
 On-the-job training: On-the-job training - CGI – World Economic Forum 
 Secondary enroll: Secondary education enrollment, gross % - CGI – World Economic Forum 
 Tertiary Enroll: Tertiary education enrollment, gross % - CGI – World Economic Forum 
 Quality math: Quality of math and science education, CGI – World Economic Forum 
 Quality of management: Quality of management schools, CGI – World Economic Forum 
 Quality of education: B. Quality of education, CGI – World Economic Forum 
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 Gov-GERD: Government-financed GERD as a percentage of GDP- OECD 
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 Qual Scient Institutions: Quality of scientific research institutions, - CGI – World Economic Forum 
 Uni Ind Coll: University-industry collaboration in R&D,- CGI – World Economic Forum 
 Venture cap: Venture capital availability, - CGI – World Economic Forum 
 Govern effectiveness: Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the govern-
ment's commitment to such policies.- WGI - World Bank 
 Regulatory quality: Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regula-
tions that permit and promote private sector development.- WGI - World Bank 
 Rule of law: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. - WGI - World Bank 
 Collective bargaining: Collective Bargaining coverage - OECD 
 Union density: Trade unions density - OECD 
Flexibility
temporary employment
EPL
Tax wages
ALMP
Labour market policies ‐ training
On‐the‐job training
Secondary enroll
Tertiary enroll
Quality of mat
Quality of management s
Quality of educationGovernment expenditure per studentBasic researchGov GERD
Business GERD
Pub Proc high thech
Qual scient institutions
Uni Ind coll
Venture cap
Goven effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Collective bargaining
Unions density
HPG LPG CUC
2020/01 
 
 
14 
Looking at data on the labour market for the mid ‘90s, it clearly emerges that flexibility did 
not characterize countries that experienced notable economic growth. The difference in 
flexibility between HPGs and LPGs was not particularly relevant, temporary employment was 
more widespread in LPGs and the level of EPL was similar between the two groups. This is 
confirmed by data on individual countries: some of them had a high flexibility but have grown 
less than other, such as the case of the United Kingdom, which had the lowest employment 
protection indicator of all the OECD countries (except the United States) but a lower level of 
productivity growth in comparison with many other countries, and there were countries with 
high flexibility where productivity has grown significantly, such as Ireland or the United 
States. At the same time, there were countries with lower level of flexibility but high 
productivity growth, such as Germany. It is also interesting to look at taxation on wages: 
countries with a higher taxation were those that experienced a higher growth. Thus, as regards 
the labor market, a regulatory intervention by the state, aimed at making work more flexible 
and less expensive, had not characterized the countries with high growth in productivity, while 
countries with the largest constraints have had a greater growth, as Wolfgang Streeck had 
already shown regarding the role of beneficial constraints in German capitalism. On the 
contrary, policies aimed at increasing skills - such as active labour market policies related to 
training or policies aimed at favoring the matching between skills demand and supply - were 
widely adopted by HPGs during the 1990s. The same is true for lifelong training and for on 
the job training. Denmark and Sweden were heading in this direction, investing heavily in 
training and in active labour market policies, as well as Germany. The exceptions among 
countries with high productivity growth are the United States and Ireland, where essentially 
there were no active labour market policies but where there was a high level of on-the-job 
training. On the contrary, all low growth countries, invested much less in skills provision and 
training. 
The positive association between productivity growth and skills emerges also looking at the 
indicators related to the second dimension: human capital. The level of schooling of the 
population – human capital broadening – at mid-90s was not strongly differentiated between 
HPGs and LPGs, neither for secondary nor for tertiary education. On the contrary, there was 
a clear difference in term of investment per student and in term of quality of the educational 
institutions – human capital deepening. For example, in the Greek case - which is one of the 
low-growth countries - there was a high level of education, both secondary and tertiary, but a 
very low level of quality both in scientific and mathematical subjects and in the management 
sector and in terms of overall quality educational offer; in other words, Greece is a low growth 
country with high schooling but low quality of educational institutions. Some HPGs such as 
France, Germany or Switzerland, on the other hand, had an average human capital broadening 
but with a very good human capital deepening. At the same time, Scandinavian countries 
benefited of a high level of schooling that went hand in hand with a high quality of educational 
institutions, and all four Scandinavian countries are in the HPGs group. All this means that 
productivity growth went hand in hand with policies aimed at raising the quality of educational 
provision and services for students, while there is not a clear association with policies aimed 
at increasing the average number of years of schooling. 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 102 
 
15 
Data on policies related to the support of innovation show a positive association with 
productivity growth. In particular, HPGs were characterized at mid-90s’ by higher public and 
private R&D spending and support for basic research, as well as collaboration relationships 
between universities and private firms, the availability of venture capital and public 
procurement practices in high-tech activities. In this policy arena it is possible to make a 
division between two different types of instruments: on the one hand, those aimed at 
promoting collaboration between public organizations (universities, research centers, 
agencies specialized in the production of knowledge, etc.) and private companies, defined as 
'collaborative RDI programs' (EC 2013) and, on the other hand, policy tools aimed at giving 
direct support to businesses through tax incentives, individual financing, or through loans.  
As regards the first policy instrument, some countries of the HPG group such as Germany, 
Denmark and Sweden invest heavily in policies aimed at promoting cooperation between 
public organizations and private companies. In particular, they finance ITC development 
agencies, specific schemes to support businesses and to encourage public research co-
financing, measures dedicated to technology transfer, and other interventions aimed at 
strengthening the relationship between public institutions and private actors and involve the 
latter in the knowledge production phase. Among the measures to promote competitiveness 
there are also those aimed at promoting territorial clusters, such as the German Top Cluster 
Program, an instrument that finances regional thematic clusters aimed at creating 
collaboration between public and private research (EC 2013). These policy instruments focus 
on the “connections” between actors, increasingly involving large companies and favoring 
their active participation and their embeddedness in a network of collaborative relationships 
with public institutions. By this point of view, the case of the United States is particularly 
interesting: in this country there are many policy tools aimed at favoring connections between 
public institutions and private companies in the field of R&D through the use of public 
procurement in activities related to innovation and R&D, such as defense: in the Us 20% of 
all public procurement resources are directed to defense in comparison to 5% in Sweden, 4% 
in Denmark, 3.8% of Germany, the 0.7 of Ireland. As many contributions have already shown 
(see Block, Mazuccato, Weiss), a notable public investment supports innovation activities in 
the US.  
As for the second policy tools, France, Ireland and Hungary, are among the countries with a 
higher support to innovation through tax incentives. The sum of direct and indirect 
interventions in favor of companies is much higher in France and in Ireland than in Sweden, 
Denmark and Germany; Ireland and France are the two countries in which tax incentives 
weigh the most: around 80% in Ireland and 79% in France of total financing are tax incentives. 
At the same time, France is the OECD country where incentives have the highest share of 
GDP. However, there is also a difference among these three countries: in France, but not in 
Hungary and Ireland that rely on FDI-based growth, a substantial part of these incentives is 
addressed to large national companies, with a small share addressed to the promotion of foreign 
direct investments: in 1990 the flows of FDI in France were equal to 1% of GDP, in the 2016 
were 1.4%; in Ireland the flows of FDI in 1990 was 1.3% of GDP and it grew to 26% in 2016.  
An interesting path of research could focus on the analysis of the different outcomes of the 
two above mentioned policy tools, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. On the contrary, 
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what is particularly important for this analysis is that all these cases show that, even if trough 
different policy instruments, the intervention of the state and its support to R&D activities 
play a notable role in supporting productivity and economic growth.  
The above-mentioned relationships are confirmed if we take into account the links between 
three indicators and the growth of productivity in the period 1995-2016: the level of GERD 
financed by the state, the expenditure in active labour market policies related to training and the 
expenditure for student at the tertiary level: countries with the higher level of investment in these 
three kinds of policy at mid 90s’ are those with a higher productivity growth (fig. 7, 8, 9).  
Figure 7. Public financed GERD in 1995 and growth in productivity for the period 
1995-2017 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
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Figure 8. Government expenditure per student, tertiary (% of GDP per capita) in 1998 
and growth in productivity for the period 1995-2017 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
 
Figure 9. Investiment in Active laour market policies Training (% of GDP) in 1995 and 
growth in productivity for the period 1995-2017 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
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Finally, there is a positive association between a better quality of governance and a higher rise 
of productivity: this positive association is valid for all three dimensions taken into 
consideration, namely the regulatory quality, the government effectiveness and the rule of law 
(fig. 6). 
This analysis shows that there is an association between some public policies and productivity 
and through this relation public policies may influence economic growth (Burroni 2016).  
Of course, in the long period 1990 - 2017 many things have happened, in particular the 2008 
crisis; in this case, financial chocks and demand effects have certainly played an important 
role influencing growth trajectories of the countries here analysed. However, it should not be 
underestimated that the institutional choices made during the 1990s influenced the capability 
of countries to face with the dynamics of the crisis. A greater investment in human capital, in 
the quality of training institutions as well as in innovation policies may have strengthened the 
competitiveness of high technology sectors and supported competitive strategies that partly 
protected firms by the impact of the crisis. Not surprisingly, if we look at the trend in the GDP 
of the two groups of countries - HPGs and LPGs - we note that the gap between them follows 
a relatively constant pace, gradually expanding after the crisis (fig. 10). In other words, the 
financial crisis has created a series of conditions for responding to which HPGs countries were 
better equipped, and a part of this comparative advantage can be found in the choices of 
political economy and the policy tools chosen by the mid-1990s. 
Figure 10. Productivity growth in the period 1990-2016 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
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influenced the latter and favored the former, and that this also influenced their ability to 
respond to the crisis. But at the same time, the differences in the institutional context at mid 
90’s between the four countries was impressive. 
At mid 90’s world Bank rated the quality of the education system 4.9 in Germany, 5.2 in 
Sweden 3.8 in Spain and 3.4 in Italy (1-7 best); the collaboration between University and 
Industry was rated 5.3 in Germany, 5.6 in Sweden, 3.4 in Spain, 3.0 in Italy. The government 
expenditure per student in tertiary education as % of GDP per capita was 38% in Germany, 
59% in Sweden, 20% in Spain and 22% in Italy. The government financed GERD as % of 
GDP was 0.8 in Germany, 0.9 in Sweden, 0.3 in Spain and 0.5 in Italy. Expenditure in ALPM 
related to training as % of GDP was 0.5% in Germany, 0.9% in Sweden, 0.1 in Spain, 0.2 in 
Italy. At the same time, in Italy and Spain specific policies to support low productivity 
manufacturing in the former and low productivity sector such as construction industry were 
implemented since the beginning of the nineties (Burroni et al. 2017 and 2019). Focusing on 
productivity growth in the four countries, it emerges that the two Mediterranean countries 
followed a particular trajectory, flattening out well before the crisis and even before entering 
the euro. The institutional environment implemented in the 1990s therefore influenced the 
different growth trajectories and then amplified the effects of the crisis. 
Figure 11. Productivity growth in Germany, Sweden, Spain and Italy in the period 
1990-2016 
 
 
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
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there is a 'systemic' effect related to the presence of an institutional context that favors high 
productivity in the two HPGs and a low productivity in the two LPGs, and that this was 
influenced by economic policy choices made in previous years. 
Table 1. Added value, labour productivity and specialization in Germany, Sweden, 
Spain and Italy (2016) 
 
  % of added value on total added value Productivity per hour worked 
  
Activities 
with me-
dium and 
high inten-
sity of R&D 
Manufacturing 
Building in-
dustry, retail, 
tourism 
Activities with 
medium and 
high intensity 
of R&D 
Manufacturing 
Building 
industry, 
retail, 
tourism 
Total acti-
vities 
Italy 8,9 16,2 25,0 42,8 34,4 24,5 33,5
Spain 7,9 13,9 29,6 44,4 37,1 24,5 31,2
Germany 18,3 23,4 20,1 83,3 53,9 29,5 42,7
Sweden 17,1 15,1 24,1 80,8 52,7 36,2 43,3
OECD average 10,5 16,6 25,3 51,4 43,6 25,9 35,1
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
This main feature is confirmed also taking into account the two groups of countries – HPGs 
and LPGs – and can be related to fact that public policies can contribute to the emerging of 
some kind of sectorial specialisation: in particular, public policies that support the develop-
ment of human capital and innovation can trigger the emerging of sectors characterized by 
high level of innovation. The high-growth countries are characterized by activities that have 
a higher intensity of research and development: among HPGs these activities exceed 10% of 
national added value in Germany, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Austria, United States, 
confirming that both cases of coordinated and liberal market economies that experienced a 
notable growth are specialized in innovation. At the same time, these countries score an inter-
mediate specialization in manufacturing and low specialization in low value-added activities. 
It is also interesting to note that HPGs have an average hourly productivity that is much higher 
than other groups for all economic activities. In particular, productivity in R&D activities in 
HPGs is almost double than in LPGs and almost four times that of CUCs. The productivity of 
HPGs in manufacturing activities is also much higher, in particular compared to CUCs (tab. 2). 
Table 2. Added value, labour productivity and specialization in 2016 
 
 % of added value on total added value Productivity per hour worked 
 
Activities 
with me-
dium and 
high inten-
sity of 
R&D 
Manufacturing 
Building in-
dustry, re-
tail, tourism 
Activities 
with medium 
and high in-
tensity of 
R&D 
Manufacturing 
Building in-
dustry, re-
tail, tourism 
Total activities 
HPGs 12,7 16,6 22,7 82,9 71,8 37,7 51,7
LPGs 7,4 13,1 24,9 43,3 41,5 26,3 34,6
CUCs 10,6 19,4 28,1 21,3 17,0 12,4 15,1
Source: Processed data from OECD and World Bank database 
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If we look at the LQ (location quotient) 5 indicator, which specifies the weight of productive 
specialization, we note that the difference between HPGs and LPGs countries is higher both 
in terms of specialization and in terms of productivity in high value-added activities, showing 
that the most notable difference between high and low growth countries in terms of 
specialization lies in the different specialization in high value added activities. On the 
contrary, advanced economies that grow at lower rates have a greater specialization in 
activities with low added value that coexists with a lower specialization both in manufacturing 
activities and in R&D intensive activities; moreover, productivity in all three sectors is much 
lower in LPGs than in HPGs (tab. 3). 
Table 3. LQ in productivity and added value 
 
 
% of added value on total added 
value Productivity per hour worked 
 
Activities 
with me-
dium and 
high in-
tensity of 
R&D 
Manufacturing 
Building 
industry, 
retail, 
tourism 
Activities 
with me-
dium and 
high in-
tensity of 
R&D 
Manufacturing 
Building 
industry, 
retail, 
tourism 
Total activi-
ties 
HPGs 1,322 1,042 0,900 1,686 1,653 1,480 1,530
LPGs 0,661 0,741 0,987 0,881 0,955 1,033 1,024
CUCs 1,017 1,218 1,114 0,433 0,391 0,487 0,447
 
Difference between HPGs and LPGs 0,661 0,301 -0,087 0,805 0,698 0,448 0,506
Difference between  HPGs and CUCs 0,305 -0,176 -0,214 1,253 1,262 0,993 1,083
Source: Processed data from Stat-OECD 
Thus, many countries with higher growth have a prevalent specialization in research and 
development activities, such as Denmark and Sweden; others have a multiple and integrated 
specialization, like the case of Germany or Ireland, specialized in R&D activities and 
manufacturing. Then, some countries have a "polarized" specialization, such as the United 
States, which have a specialization in R&D activities but also in low productivity activities. 
Finally, there are countries that have a prevalent specialization in low-productivity activities 
both in terms of added value and employment, that is compatible with a sort of low 
productivity equilibrium, as in the case of Spain up until the 2007 crisis. 
Conclusion 
The first part of this paper focused on GDP per capita growth in OECD countries over the 
past 25 years. A process of catching-up between developing countries and advanced 
economies emerged and narrowed the distance between rich and poor countries. Among 
advanced economies that experienced a notable growth there are cases of coordinated 
capitalism, such as Germany and Sweden together with the United States and Ireland for 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism : at the same time, cases of coordinated capitalism can be found also 
                                                 
5 The location quotient (Lq) is calculated as: Lq = (e/n)Y/(E/N)Y, where the ratio between e and n is the quota of national added value 
accounted by activity Y, while the ratio between E and N for the quota of added value accounted by activity Y at the OECD level. 
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among countries characterized by low growth – such as Japan – along with Anglo-Saxon 
economies – such as the UK. All this means that there is not a model of capitalism with “silver 
bullet”, but their dynamics depend on the role played by their institutional architecture and in 
the making of this architecture the action of the state play a notable role. In particular, data 
shows that labour productivity is particularly important to explain growth trajectories. 
For this, reason, it is important to focus on the role played by the state and in particular on the 
set-up of public policies that are directly related to the growth of productivity. In order to 
understand this role, I analyzed the action of the state at the beginning of the period of analysis 
(mid 90s’) in labour market regulation, human capital and innovation in countries 
characterized by high and low productivity growth (HPGs and LPGs). This analysis shows 
that there is a positive association between some types of public policies and the rise of labour 
productivity.  
In particular, as for the regulation of labour market, countries with higher rate of growth 
(HPGs) were characterized by higher level of investment in skills and in active labour market 
policies, while higher level of flexibility or lower labour costs are not a specific feature of 
HPGs. As for human capital, HPG countries were characterized by a high level of quality of 
education – human capital deepening – while policies aimed at increasing the average number 
of years of schooling – human capital broadening – were not a typical characteristic of HPGs. 
Moreover, quality of research institutions, support for innovative forms of credit, the 
promotion of forms of cooperation between public and private sectors, the overall level of 
investment in R&D, both public and private, were important part of an institutional 
environment that was prone to the rise of labour productivity. Finally, the positive association 
between the quality of public administration and high productivity growth is confirmed: HPGs 
countries were those that in the mid-1990s had higher values in the three indicators here 
analyzed, i.e. rule of law, government effectiveness and regulatory quality. This particular 
institutional asset, characterized by high public investments in human capital and innovation, 
went hand in hand with the rise of specialization in high added value activities: in some HPG 
countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, there is a prevalent specialization in this kind of 
activities, in other cases the specialization in R&D goes hand in hand with other kind of 
specialization such as advanced manufacturing (Germany or Ireland) or in low added value 
activities (such as the US). 
This path allows us to identify a 'basic grammar' of the relationship between the state, its 
policies and productivity growth, and this grammar implies that if comparative political 
economy wants to explain why some countries grow more than other should take seriously 
into account that public policies in some specific fields matter.  
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